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in Williams v. The State, 48 Ind. 306 t intention of statute law, it is not easy to
an indictment for selling intoxicating reconcile all the cases on the subject by
liquor to a person "in the habit of get- any different phraseology used in the
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STATE v. JONES.
Allowing a witness to answer a question only slightly leading, if at all, and
which does not prejudice the party objecting, is not such error as will warrant a
reversal.
Allowing a witness to answer a question calling for a conclusion of fact relevant
to the case, such conclusion not being the ultimate fact to be found by the jury, is
not error.
To render declarations admissible as a part of the res gestm, it is not necessary that
they should be precisely concurrent in point of time with the principal transaction.
It is sufficient if they are near enough to clearly appear to be so spontaneous and
unpremeditated and free from sinister motives, as to afford a reliable explanation
of the principal transaction.
Questions asked upon cross-examination not tending to modifyor explain the tesitimony of the witness given in chief, but to elicit testimony which would have the
effect to discredit the testimony which the witness had given in chief; are not admissible as cross-examination.
Instructions must be based upon evidence and must not be misleading.
When the defence of insanity is interposed to an indictment for murder, evidence
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* as to the conduct, language and appearance of the defendant at other times than
during the time of the alleged killing, is admissible, and an instruction which limits
the evidence to the time of the alleged killing is erroneous.
If the evidence makes it merely probable to the jury that the defendant was insane
at the time of the killing, heshould be acquitted. It is suffcient if the evidence
of insanity preponderates.
and RoTmxooxi, JJ., dissenting.
Szznvsz

APPEAL from the District Court of Harrison county.

The*defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree. He
was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to the penitentiary
for seven years. From the judgment he appeals.
Scott & Hight, for appellant.
Smith McPher8on,Atty.-Gen., for the State.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ADnAms, J.---This case is before us on a second appeal. See 52
Iowa 150. The defendant was charged with the murder of one
Roberts. In February, 1878, the defendant and Roberts were
engaged in farming, and resided upon adjoining farms in the
county of Pottawattamie. On the sixth day of that month Roberts
was found dead in the road, about thirty rods from the defendant's
house. There was a hole in his head- near one eye, and a pistol
ball was found in his brain. He bad left home a short time
previous 'with the avowed intention of going on an errand to the
house of one Axtel.; The road from Roberts's house to Axtel's led
by the defendant's. Circumstances, not necessary to be detailed
here, indicated strongly that Roberts was killed by the defendant.
His counsel contend that if he killed Roberts he did so in selfdefence. They also contend that he was in such an unsound condition of mind that he was not responsible for his acts. Soon after
Roberts died, and ndt far from where he died the defendant was
seen with blood running down both sides of his face, indicating
that he had received an injury. As to his mental condition the
evidence shows beyond controversy that he was suffering under
great depression, caused by trouble of the gravest character. His
family was broken up. His wife, as the evidence tends strongly
to show, had committed adultery with Roberts, and the fact had come
to the defendant's knowledge. She had left him and had removed
all the furniture from the house except a bedstead, and he had
reason to apprehend that Roberts would the next day, or soon there-

STATE v. JONES.

after, dispossess him of the house. To the specific evidence of
insanity we shall refer briefly hereafter.
1. The defendant assigns as error the admission of certain
evidence. One McOaen was examined as a witness in behalf of the
state. He testified that the evening before Roberts's death he saw
him at Axtel's. For the purpose of showing that Roberts was on
legitimate business at the time he was killed, the state sought to
show that he had an errand'at Axtel's that day. It accordingly
asked MoCuen a question in these words : "State if any arrangement was made, on the evening prior to the decease of Roberts, by
which Roberts was to go to Axtel's the next day." This question was objected to by the defendant as leading, immaterial, and
incompetent. The court overruled the objection and the witness
answered: "He made an arrangement to be there the next morning, between eight and nine o'clock, to look at some steers Axtel
had to sell."
The question, strictly considered, called for answer by yes or no,
and possibly it might be considered as indicating that the interrogator desired that the answer should be in the affirmative. But
the question was only very slightly leading, if at all, and it seems clear
to us that the defendant was not prejudiced by the character of the
question as leading. He further objects, however, that the question
called for a conclusion. He insists that an arrangementis the result
of what is said, and that if any evidence upon the subject was admissible the witness should have been asked for what was said and not
the result. If the case were to turn upon whether there was or was
not an arrangement,-thatis, if that were the ultimate fact to be
found by the jury,-there would be much force in the defendant's
objection. But that was not an ultimate fact. Any evidence
of talk indicating Roberts's purpose to go to Axtel's the next morning to buy steers, though amounting to less than arrangement, would
have had substantially the same effect. It would have Jeen a
circumstance tending to show that Roberts's journey that morning
towards the defendant's house was' explainable upon a different
theory from that of the defendant, which was that he was out seeking the defendant's life or injury. It is further objected that what
was said was at least but hearsay, and inadmissible for that reason,
if no other. The talk, it is true, was not concurrent with thejourney
in point of time. But to render declarations admissible as a part
of the res geste, it is not necessary that they should be precisely
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concurrent in point of time with the principal transaction. It is
sufficient if they are near enough to clearly appear to be so spontaneous and unpremeditated, and free from sinister motives, as to
afford a reliable explanation of the principal transaction. People
v. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49 ; Mitchell v. State, 41 Ga. 533; Handy v.
Johnson, 5 Md. 450. The case at bar, we think, comes within
the rule. We see no error in allowing the question to be
answered.
2. One Orlando Wright, a nephew of the defendant, was examined as a witness in behalf of the state. Having testified that five
or six weeks prior to Roberts's death the defendant borrowed a
revolver belonging to the witness' brother, he was asked by the
defendant on cross-examination whether the defendant was not at
that time living on friendly terms with Roberts.
The state
objected to the question as not in cross-examination, and the objection was sustained. In this we think there was no error. It was
not the object of the question to allow the witness to modify or
explain his testimony given in chief, nor was it to elicit testimony
which should have the effect to discredit the testimony which the
witness had given in chief. The object was to prove an independent fact, not explanatory of nor inconsistent with the testimony
given, but to render the fact testified to consistent with the defendant's innocence ; or, in other words, the object was to rebut the effect
which the state intended to produce. It appears to us, therefore,
that if the defendant desired to introduce such evidence it was
more proper that he should be required to do so in rebuttual.
3. The court instructed the jury that f' if the evidence shows that
the defendant deliberately formed a design to take the life of Roberts,
and sought a meeting with him for the purpose of executing that
design, and in that meeting and in pursuance of that design inflicted
upon Roberts the wound which caused his death, the crime, if he
is responsible for the act, is murder in the second degree." The
defendant assigns the giving of this instruction as error. It is contended by the defendant that there is no evidence that he sought a
meeting with the design to take Roberts's life. We think that the
evidence is very strotig that the defendant took Roberts's life by
shooting him with a revolver. That he sought a meeting with that
intent the evidence is not so strong. But if he took Roberts's life
with a revolver, then it would seem that he must have taken a revolver with him when he proceeded to the place of meeting. The case
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is quite different from what it would have been if Roberts bad been
killed with a club, or some weapon which might be supposed to
have been picked up by the wayside. We think that there was
some evidence that the defendant sought a meeting with the design
of killing Roberts.
4. The court gave an instructioi in these words: "You have
evidence of the conduct, language, and appearance of the accused
during the time of the alleged killing, during which time it is
alleged that he was insane. You are to consider all the facts
which you find to be established by the evidence, and which relate
to the conduct, language, and appearance of the defendant during
that time; and you should consider them for the double purp6 se of
testing the value of the opinions of such witnesses as have given
opinions on the question of the defendant's insanity, based upon
such facts, and of determining whether the fact of insanity is
established independent of-such opinions." The defendant assigns
the giving of this instruction as error. The objection urged is that
the jury was told in substance that if they found the defendant
insane they must so find from facts independent of opinions. We
hardly think that the instruction, even when taken by itself, is susceptible of such construction. But the jury was expressly told, in
another instruction, that they were to determine what weight and
credit should be given to the opinions of witnesses upon the ques'tion of insanity. The jury,. we think, could not have been misled
in the way which the defendant claims. While we say this, we
ought, perhaps, to say that we do not regard the question as to
whether insanity was fully established by facts independent of
opinions necessary to be considered. It is true that the facts, as
the court said, were to be considered for a double purpose. But, in
defining the double purpose, we should have been better pleased if
the court had said that they might be considered for the purpose
of testing the value of the opinions, and upon the question as to
how far they tended to establish the fact of insanity independent
of the opinions. We make this criticism the more freely because
we have reached the conclusion that for errors to be pointed out
hereafter the case must be reversed and remanded for another trial.
5. The instruction above set out in our opinion contains error.
The jury was directed to consider the facts relating to the conduct,
language, and appearance of the defendant during the time of the
alleged killing. Now, while it is true that it was not material
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whether the defendant was insane at any other time, if he was sane
at that time, yet his conduct, language, and appearance at other
times were not to be excluded. There was no evidence whatever
as to the conduct, language, and appearance of the defendant at
the precise time when Roberts was killed. He was seen by others
on that day, but the evidence of insanity pertains to other days. The
evidence showed that he was insane in early life, and had not fully
recovered when he came to western Iowa. There was evidence
tending to show that from the time of his first insanity "any
trouble," (to use the language of the witness), " would throw him
off his balance." Four relatives of the defendant testified to his
changed mental condition from the time when his trouble with
Roberts commenced, and they gave their opinion that he was insane.
Two others, who do not appear to be relatives, testified to strange
conduct of the defendant, and gav e their opinion that he was insane.
In addition to that, one physician testified that he made an examination of him, and regarded him as insane. While the court did
not say that the jury should not consider the conduct, language,
and appearance of the defendant at times other than that of the
alleged killing, the tendency of the instruction was to confine, by
implication, the attention of the jury to that time. In this it
appears to us that there was error.
6. The court gave an instruction in these words: "The burden
is on the defendant to establish by a preponderance of evidence
that at the time of the killing of Roberts, if he did kill him, he
was in such a state of insanity as not to be accountable for the act;
and if the evidence goes no further than to show that such a state
of mind was possible or merely probable, it is not sufficient, but it
must go further and overcome the presumption of sanity, and fairly
satisfy you that he was not sane." The giving of this instruction
is assigned as error. In our opinion the instruction cannot be sustained. If it was made probable to the jury that the defendant was
so far insane as not to be accountable for his acts, we think that he
should have been acquitted. Worcester defines probable as "having
more evidence than the contrary." Webster defines it as " h av ing
more evidence for than against." We think that it was sufficient
if the evidence of insanity preponderated. The idea of the court
seems to have been that as the presumption of sanity counts for
something it cannot be said to be overcome by a bare preponderance
of evidence. There is a course of reasoning which might, perhaps,
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seem to support this view. The difference between a bare preponderance of evidence and that which is next less might be said to be
infinitely small, and that what is infinitely small cannot be weighed
or appreciated. Bnt such considerations are too refined. The rule
as to the presumption of sanity has its practical application in imposing the burden of proof upon him who sets up insanity. This
is all. The presumption is not to be weighed against any measurable
amount of evidence.
The judgment, we think, must be reversed, and the case remanded
for another trial.
SEEVERS, J., and ROTHROCK, J., dissented.
The question upon which party rests
the burden of proving sanity or insanity
in criminal cases, where insanity is relied
upon as a defence, is one upon which
there is considerable conflict of authority.
Perhaps a majority of the cases will be
found to hold that the rule that all the
facts constituting the guilt of the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the defendant is entitled
to the benefit of a reasonable doubt, does
not apply to his sanity, which is presumed till the contrary is proved by a
preponderance of evidence, the burden
being on the defendant to prove his
insanity by a preponderance of evidence,
as in case of any other independent fact
constituting a defence. See State v.
McCoy, 34 Mo. 531 ; State v. Klinger,
43 Id. 127 ; a. c. 46 Id. 224; State v.
Hundey, 46 Id. 414 ; State v. Smith,
53 Id. 267 ; State v. Brown, 12 Minn.
538 ; State v. Starling, 6 Jones's L.
366; People v. Robison, 1 Park. Cr.
649 ; U. S. v. McGlue, I Curt. C. C.
7 ; Loffner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598;
Bond v. State, 23 Id. 349; People v.
Myers, 20 Cal. 518: People v. Coffman,
24 Id. 230 ; People v. McDonell, 47 Id.
134; Krid v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush
(Ky.) 362 ; State v. Lawrence, 57 Me.
574; Boswell v. Commonwealth, 20
Gratt. 860; Sate v. Felter, 32 Iowa
49 ; Newcomb v. tate, 37 Miss. 383.
State v. Brinyea, 5 Ala. 241 ; HumVOL. XXXII.-98

phreys v. State, 45 Geo. 190; Lynch v.
Commonwealth, 77 Penn. St. 205 ; Reg.
v. Laton, 4 Cox C. C. 149 ; McKenzie
v. State, 26 Ark. 334; State v. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691.
As regards the point involved in
the principal case, the opinion 9f the
majority of the court seems much more
reasonable than that of the dissenting
judges. Indeed it is difficult to see how
the court in view of the prevailing rule
in that state, could have arrived at any
other conclusion than that arrived at by
the majority of the judges. If it is not
allowable to resort to dictionaries for a
definition of the word 9"probable," as
was done by the majority of the court,
there would be difficulty in ascertaining
its meaning, unless the minority would
settle the meaning of the word by judicial decision, or entirely disregard the
word and assigm no meaning to it.
But there is another class of cases
which lays down what, in view of the
presumption of the innocence of the accused, seems to be a much more reasonable rule than that either in the principal case, and prevailing, perhaps, in
the majority of the states, that sanity
being the normal condition of the mind,
"they (the prosecution) are at liberty
to rest upon the presumption of sanity
until proof of the contrary condition is
given by the defence. But when any
evidence is given which tends to over-
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throw that presumption, the jury are to
examine, weigh and pass upon it with
the understanding that, although the
initiative in presenting the evidence is
taken by the defence,* the burden of
proof upon this part of the case, as well
as upon the other, is upon the prosecution to establish the condition of guilt:"
People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 23; People
v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Commonwealth v.Kimball, 24 Pick. 373 ; Commonwealth v.Dana, 2 Mete. 340; State
T. Marler, 2 Ala. 43 ; Commonwealth v.
McKie, I Gray 61 ; Commonwealth v.

Rogers, 7 Mete. 500 ; Hoppes V. People,
31 Ill. 385 ; Chase v. 'People, 40 Id.
352 ; Doty v. State, 7 Blackf. 427 ;
Walter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147. See,
-also, State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224;
Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485 ; Commonwealth v. Heath, 11 Gray 303; State v.
Crawford, 11 Kans. 42; Anderson Y.
State, 42 Geo. 9 ; Smith v. Commonwealth, I Davall (Ky.) 224; State v.
Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 ; 2 Eish. Cr.
.Prac., sects. 599, 673, 699, and cases
cited.
M. D. EwLL.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
CITY OF TOPEKA v. GILLETT.
Where an act of the legislature attempting to confer corpor#e powers is so
special in its provisions that it can apply only to three certain cities, and cannot
possibly, at any time, apply to any other corporation, public or private, it is in
contravention uf sect. 1, art. 12, of the Constitution, which provides that "the
legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate power;," and is void.
For the purpose of construing a constitution or statute, courts may take judicial
notice of everything which may affect the validity or meaning of such constitution
or statute.
An act of the legislature may be special where it applies to many particular and
existing persons or things, as well as where it applies to only one; and it may he
special where it simply describes such particular persons or things so that they may
be known, as well as where it gives their particular names or distinctive appellations.
Where a supposed addition to a city of the first class has never been subdivided
into lots, blocks; streets and alleys, by the proprietors thereof with any intention
that it should become a part of the city, and no map or plat of such supposed addition has ever been made, acknowledged or filed in the office of the register of deeds,
by such proprietors, or with their consent or by their authority, and such proprietors have never consented that such supposed addition should be made or should
become a part of tle city: Held, that an ordinance of the city defining the boundaries of the city, and including such supposed addition within its boundaries, does
not bring such supposed addition within the boundaries of the city.
And where the city claims that such supposed addition is within the city limits,
but such claim has at all times been disputed and resisted by the proprietorsthereof:
Held, that such proprietors are not estopped from maintaining an action to enjoin
the collection of a tax levied by the city upon the plaintiffs' property situated in
such supposed additi)u.

ERtoR from Shawnee County.
A. B. Quinton and J. B. Johnson, attorneys for plaintiffs.
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C. H. Poster, W. P. Douthitt and Waters " .Ensminger,attorneys for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VALENTINE, J.-This action was commenced by James Gillett
and other taxpayers and residents of what is called "Ritchie's
Addition" to the city of Topeka, against the city and others, to
enjoin the collection of certain taxes, claimed to be illegal and void,
levied by the city upon the plaintiffs' property situated in such
so-called addition. It is admitted that if such so-called addition
is a part of the city of Topeka, the taxes attempted to be enjoined are legal and valid; and whether such so-called addition
is a part of the city of Topeka or not, depends upon other questions, the principal of which is, whether Chapter 73 of the Laws
of 1875, is constitutional and valid, or not. That act reads as
follows :
"An act supplemental to an act entitled ' An act to incorporate
cities of the second class,' approved February 28th 1872."
"Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Kansas:
"Sect. 1. The 'city council, in their discretion, may add from
the territory adjacent to the city limits, as defined and existing at
the date of the approval of this act, such additional territory as
they may deem proper, and shall, in every case, have power to
increase or diminish the city limits in such mxanner as in their
judgment and discretion may redound to the benefit of the city:
Provided, That before said city council shall add from the adjacent
territory any additional territory to the city, and enlarge the limits
thereof, the mayor of the city shall give twenty days' notice in
some newspaper published in said city; or if no newspaper be published therein, then twenty days' notice in some newspaper of
general circulation in the city, of the time and place of meeting
of the city council, at which the proposition for the enlargement of
the limits of the city will be taken up and considered by the city
council ; at which time and place any person having an interest in
any property proposed to be included in said city limits, shall have
a right to be present and be heard before the city council; and said
notice shall specify and describe the territory that is proposed to be
included in the limits of the city.
"Sect. 2. No city of the second class shall avail itself of the
provisions of this act after the first day of May, and not unless the
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city council shall, within ten days from the time of the taking
effect of this act, give notice by resolutions, passed by a majority
of its council, of the intention of the city to avail itself of the provisions of this act; such notice to be by publication in some newspaper published in said city; said publication to be made within
ten days from the time of the taking effect of this act: Provided,
That this act shall not apply to cities of less than six thousand
inhabitants."
Section 3 of' this act, which is the last section, simply provides
when the act shall take effect and how it shall be published.
The act was approved March 3d 1875, and took effect March 7th
1875.
It is claimed by the plaintiffs below, defendants in error, that
this act is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it contravenes sect. 1, art. 12, of the constitution of Kansas, which reads
as follows:
"Sect. 1. The legislature shall pass no special act conferring
corporate powers. Corporations may be created under general
laws; but all such laws .may be amended or repealed."
. It is admitted that sect. 1, art. 12, of the constitution applies to
cities, towns and villages, as well as to corporations of a private
character; and that all such corporations, municipal as well as
private, must be created, governed, regulated and controlled by
general laws only; and cannot be created, governed, regulated or
controlled, or increased or diminished, by any merely special act
or acts. On the other hand, it is also admitted that a statute, in
order to be valid, need not be so general in its terms or character
as to have application to all the corporations of the state, public and
private; but it is admitted that the various corporations coming
within the provisions of said sect. 1, art. 12, public as well as
private, may be classified, and that valid acts may be passed with
reference to each particular class. Of course, however, there must
be a limit to classification. The classes cannot be made so numerous that it would require a separate statute for each separate
corporation; nor could any supposed class be so specifically named
or defined that only one particular corporation could come within
such name or definition; for in either such case the statute itself
would be special and not general. It is admitted that cities may
be divided into three classes, and possibly into six or more
classes; or -possibly into three classes, and then each subdivided
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into two or more sub-classes. Up to the present time the cities
of the state of Kansas have been divided into three classes, and
three classes only, and only upon the basis of population. May
they be divided into classes upon some other basis? For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to answer this question; and
yet we might remark, as above intimated, that they cannot be
divided into classes simply by their names, or by some specific
description amounting only to a name. They could not be designated as all the cities of the state of Kansas by the name of Topeka
or Leavenworth or Atchison: City of Council Grove, 20 Kans.
619 et 8eq., and cases there cited. And precisely the same result
would follow if a description were used apparently general, but
really so specific that it could not apply to anything except to
certain particular and existing things: The State v. Lawrence
Bridge Co., 22 Kans. 438. Also, for the purposes of this case,
we shall assume that the legislature may pass valid acts conferring
corporate powers where the acts themselves, for the time being,
apply only to one municipal corporation; as, for instance, the
various acts passed by the legislature of Kansas from 1862 up to
1880, for the government of cities of the first class, and which acts
really applied only to the single city of Leavenworth. But such
acts, in order to be valid, must in their form be general, and they
must also be such that, in the ordinary course of things, they
might and probably would apply to other corporations. Take, forinstance, the first-class city act that was first enacted in this state.
That act-was for the government of all cities or municipal corporations of not less than 7000 inhabitants: Laws of 1862, chap. 46.
At the time of its passage it applied only to the single city of Leavenworth; but it was a general act in its form, theoretically
applying to a class of cities, and theoretically enacted for all
time to come; and if it had not been repealed or modified by
subsequent legislation, it would now apply to nine different cities
9 f the state of Kansas. Theoretically it was enacted for all
cities which might in all the future attain to the population of
7000, as well as for the city of Leavenworth, which then had that
population. If, however, at the time of its passage there had
been no probability that any other city of the state of Kansas than
Leavenworth would ever attain to or have a population of 7000,
the act in all probability would long ago have been declared unconstitutional and void, as being a special act conferring corporate
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powers, in violation -of sect. 1, art. 12, of the constitution: The
State ex rel. v.- Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340 ; Devine v. Gommissioners
of Cookc Co., 84 Ill. 590; The State ex rel. v. Hammer, 42 N. J.
L. (13 Vroom) 435; The State ex rel. v. Mitchell, 81 Ohio St.
592; Commonwealth ex reZ. v. Patton, 88 Penn. St. 258, 260.
The defendants in error, plaintiffs below, do not claim that the
legislature cannot confer special corporate powers upon corporations, but what they do claim is that the legislature *cannot, by a
apecial act, confer corporate powers of any kind, general or special,
upon corporations. The question, then, in the present case, is not
whether the powers attempted to be conferred by the legislature in
1875 upon certain cities of the second class, by said chapter 73 of
the laws of 1875, are special powers or not; but the question is,
whether the act attempting to confer such powers is a special act or
not. As before stated, the act is general in its form, but, as before
intimated, the constitutionality of the act is not to be determined
by its form, but is to be determined by what in the ordinary course
of things must necessarily be its operation and effect. If its opera
tion and effect -must necessarily be special, the act is special, whatever may. be -its form. I4 on the other hand, the act has room
within its terms to operate upon all of a class of things, present and
prospective, and not merely upon one particular thing, or upon a
particular class of things existing at the time of its passage, the
act is general.
We now come to the more particular consideration of the act
in controversy. Is it general or is it special ? It excludes from
the scope and operation of its provisions all private corporations;
all public corporations except cities; all cities of the first class ;
all cities of the third class; all cities of the second class, except
such as have a population of 6000 and over; all cities not obtaining the benefit of the act within fifty-eight days after its passage;
all cities not giving notice under this act within fourteen days after
its passage or within ten days after its taking effect; and, indeed,
excluding all corporations of the state of Kansas, except three
cities, to wit: Topeka, Lawrence and Atchison; and it gives to
these three cities only fourteen days after its passage within which
to commence action under it; and only fifty-eight days after its
passage within which to complete such action; and at the expiration of that time-the law ceases to have operation and becomes
ineffectual and defunct. At the time when this act was passed
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there were just ten cities of the second class in the state of Kansas ;
and this act excluded from its operation all these .citieg except
the three cities above named: Topeka, Lawrence and Atchison.
We have taken judicial notice, without formal proof, of some of
the matters and things which we have stated; for courts, for the
purpose of construing a constitution or a statute, may take judicial
notice of everything which may affect the validity or meaning of
such constitution or statute: Division of Howard County, 15 Kans.
194; see, also, the cases above cited. Courts may take judicial
notice of the census returns, of the general history of the country,
of what the members of the legislature ought to know when passing the statute which the courts are called upon to construe, and
indeed, of what all well-informed persons ought to know. And,
taking judicial notice of all these things, we can say without hesitation that it was not possible for the said act of March 3, .1875,.
within the time within which it was to have force and effect, to
apply to any corporation except the three cities of Topeka, Lawrence and Atchison. It would apply to just those three cities, no
more and no less; and any person who would take the trouble to
inform himself with regard to the matter would know it.' Is such
an act a general act, or is it merely a special act? It is our
opinion that it is merely a special act. It is true, it applies to
three cities, and not merely to one; but the act declared unconsti"tutional in the case of the City of Council Grove, 20 Kans. 619,
applied to four cities, and not merely to one ; and the-act declared
unconstitutional in the case of the Sate ez rel. v. Hammer, 42
N. J. L. (13 Yroom) 435, applied to two cities and not merely to
one; and the act declared unconstitutional in the cas* of the State
ex rel. v. The Lawrence Bridge Co., 22 Kans. 438, applied to
several dih'erent corporations, and not merely to one; and the act
declared unconstitutional in the case of the State ex rel. v. Rerrmann, 75 Mo. 340, applied to a large number of notaries public,
and not merely to one.
It is also true that the act in controversy does not specifically
name the cities of Topeka, Lawrence or Atchison; but it so describes them that there can be no possible question with regard to
the application of the law to them, and to them only; and this is
substantially the same as naming them. In this respect, this act
is like all the acts held to be unconstitutional in all the various cases
above cited, except the case of the 0ity of Council Grove, 20 Kans.
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619. The names are not given in such acts, but the corporations,
or persons, to which the acts are intended to apply are so specifically described that such corporations or persons may be definitely
known. Under the authorities, an act may be special where it
applies to many particular and existing persons or things, as well
as where it applies to only one; and it may be special where it
simply describes the particular persons or things so that they may
be known, as well as where it gives their particular names or distinctive appellations.
The act in question, we think, is unconstitutional and void; and
this we think will require that the judgment of the court below be
affirmed. It is true that counsel for both parties have raised several
other questions; but after a careful consideration of all of them,
we have arrived at the conclusion that no proper decision of any
of them would require any different disposition of the case. The
fact that the city of Topeka, about February 25, 1882, passed an
ordinance defining the boundaries of the city, and including
"Ritchie's Addition," within such boundaries did not, under section
eight of the First Class City Act, Laws of 1881, ch. 87, or under
any other statute, bring such so-called addition within the boundaries of the city of Topeka. Such so-called addition has never been
subdivided into lots, blocks, streets and alleys, by the proprietors
thereof, with any intention that it should become a part of the city
of Topeka. No map or plat of -such so-called addition has ever
been made, acknowledged, or filed in the office of the Register of
Deeds by such proprietors, or* with their consent or by their
authority. See Comp. Laws of 1879, chap. 78. And such proprietors have, never consented that such so-called addition should
be made or should become a part of the city of Topeka. There
has really nothing ever been done by the proprietors of such
go-called addition which could be so "approved by the Mayor and
Council," under said section 8, as to bring such so-called addition
within the boundaries of the city of Topeka. Any approval of
what the proprietors have done would simply keep such so-called
addition outside of the boundaries of the city, instead of bringing it
within. Neither do we think that the plaintiffs, under the circumstances of this case, are estopped from maintaining their action.
The claim of the city of Topeka, that said so-called addition was
within the boundaries of the city of Topeka, has always been disputed and resisted by the proprietors of such so-called addition,
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*and as late as April 8, 1876, one of such proprietors, and the principal proprietor, obtained a judgment against the city of Topeka,
enjoining the city and others from collec.ting city taxes levied upon
the property in such so-called addition, and declaring that such
so-called addition was not within the boundaries of the city of
Topeka. Considering this continuous dispute, and the notic6 that
the city of Topeka has had of such dispute, we cannot say that
the plaintiffs are estopped from maintaining their present action.
The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
Nearly all of the state constitutions
contain some provision to secure equality
and uniformity in the operation and enforcement of statutes. Some of them
contain only a general declaration that
no local or special law shall be
enacted in cases where a general law
can be made applicable. Others einmerate, with more or less particularity
of detail, the cases in which special
legislation is prohibited, and others
contain both the enumeration of cases
and the general prohibition. Under the
general clause an important question
has arisen, viz., Is the legislature or the
court the proper tribunal to determine
whether a general law can be made
applicable. The weight of decided cases
preponderates in favor of the view that
the legislature is the sole judge. See
Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 ; K lly v.
State, 92 Id. 236 ; Johnson v. Joliet 6-C. Railroad, 23 Ill. 202 ; State v. Robbins, 51 Mlo. 82; Hall v. Bray, Id.
288 ; Com. v. Shoemaker, 27 Kans. 77.
But the question may still be considered
an open one. See the opinions in Pell
v. Newark, 40 N. J. Law 71 ; Clarke
v. Irwin, 5 Nev. III; Ex parte Pritz,
9 Iowa 30; Town of McGregor v. Baylies, 19 Id. 43 ; Earle v. Bd. of Ed.,
55 Cal. 489; McKemie v. Gorman, 68
Ga. 442.
It is worthy of note that in one at
least of the states in which the courts
had declined to entertain jurisdiction of
the question, the people in a subsequent
VOL. M
.99

constitution enacted that, "Whether ageneral law could have been made applicable in any case is hereby declared a
judicial question, and as such shall be
judicially determined without regard to
any legislative assertion on that subject." (Constitution of, Missouri of
1875.)
M[ost of the cases that have arisen
under these constitutional provisions
have involvdd the construction of the
words "local" and "special."
Some
courts have given to these words, when
applied to statutes, the meaning of
"private" as distinguished from "public," and baie held that no statute is to
be considered as local or special which
would, at common law, have been considered a public statute: Allen v.
Hirsch, 8 Oregon 412; Hingle v. State,
24 Ind. 29 ; affirmed in Railroad Y.
Nordyke, 27 Id. 95.
It is evident, however, that in the con-stitutional provisions now under discussion the word4 are used in a somewhat
broader sense, and each word has a
distinct and peculiar significance. The
general purpose of the restrictions is to
secure uniform and equal laws-to have
the rights of citizens regulated by a
harmonious system of general and uniform laws, father than by a collection
of separate inconsistent enactments
each applying tb a restricted locality,
a particular individual or a special case. In carrying out this design the restriction on "local" laws was intended, to

CITY OF-TOPEKA v. GILLETT.
prevent arbitrary distinctions in the
operation of laws between different
localities, while the word "special"
was intended to prevent like arbitrary
distinctions between persons or things.
Although the cases show great contrariety
of opinion the general tendency of the
more recent authorities seems to be
toward a construction which will carry
out this general design to secure uniformity in legislation. See Hammer v.
State, 44 N. J. Law 667 ; Freeholders
of Passaic v. Stevenson, 46 Id. 173;
Stdte v. Hermann, 75 Mo. 340; Davis
v. Clark, 15 Weekly Notes 209: in re
N. Y. Elevated Railroad,70 N. Y. 328;
Earle v. Bd. f Ed., 55 Cal. 489 ; Ex
parte Westerfield, Id. 550 ; Mitchell v.
McCorkle, 69 Ind. 184; People v.
Cooper, 83 Ill. 585. Compare, howoyer- People v. Newburgh, 4-c., Plank
Road Co., 86 N. Y. 1, and Lastro
v. State, 3 Tex. App. 363, in each
of which it was held that an act
exempting from its operation certain
counties is not a local act; and on
the general subject, see People v.
Allen, 42 N. Y. 378; People v. Supervisors, 43 Id. 10; Kerrigan v. Force,
68 Id. 381 ; People v. O'Brien, 38 Id.
193; In re Church, 92 Id. 1 ; Williams
v. The People, 24 Id. 405; People v.
McCann, 16 Id. 58; People v. Hills, 35
Id. 449 ; Anderson v. City of Trenton,
42 N. J. L. 486; Sutterly v. Camden
Com. Pleas, 41 Id. 495; Pope v. Pifer,
3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 682; Young v. Hall,
9 Nev. 212; Iowa R. W. Land Co. v.
Soper, 39 Iowa 112; State v. King, 37
Id. 462; State v. Lawrence Bridge Co.,
22 Kans. 438; Desmond v. Dunn, 55
Cal. 242 ; Ex parte Chin Yan, 60 Id.
78: Klokke v. Dodge, 103 Ill. 125;
Devine v. Comrs., 84 Id. 590; Frye v.
Partridge,82 Id. 267 ; Peoplev. Wright,
70 Id. 388; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio
St. 54; State v. Walton, 69 Mo. 556;
State v. St. L., K. C. 4- N. Railroad, 9
Mo. App. 532; O'Brian v. Corn., 51
Md. 15; MceConihe v. State, 17 Fla.

238; Smith v. Warden, 80 Ky. 608;
Orr v. Rhine, 45 Texas 345; and for
the distinction between "local"
and
"special," see State v. Comrs., 29 Md.
516.
In general language a local statute
may be said to be one that is operative
only within a portion of a state, and a
special statute one that is applicable
only to particular individuals. It is
evident, however, that in many cases
this definition is too broad. A statute
which authorized seaport cities to make
quarantine regulations might, by reason
of the limited coast line of a state,
operate within a very restricted locality, and yet the statute would not
be a local law. So a statute providing for the registration of physicians would not be a special statute,
although it applied only to a small
number of individuals in comparison
with the whole population. The definition must be qualified so as to admit the
right of the legislature to classify both
localities and persons, and to legislate
for any such class provided the law is
uniform in its operation on the members
of the class. This right to classify is
now well settled, and it follows, as a
logical result, that so long as the classification is proper, the right cannot be
affected by the fact that the class contains but a few or even but one individual: Wheeler v. City of Philadelphia,
77 Penn. St. 338; Kilgore v. Magee,
85 Id. 401 ; In re N. Y. Elevated Railroad, 70 N. Y. 328; Van Riper V.
Parsons, 40 N. J. L. I ; Lake v. Palmer, 18 Fla. 500; Hanlon v. Corers., 53
Ind. 124; State v. Reitz, 62 Id. 159;
Johnson v. Elevator Co., 105 Ill. 462;
Reynolds v. Foster, 89 Id. 257 ; State v.
Brewster, 39 Ohio St. 653; State v.
Turnpike Co., 37 Id. 481 ; XcAunich
v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa 338.
It is apparent, however, that unless
this power of classification is itself
limited, it will destroy the effect of the
prohibition against local and special legis-
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lation. For example, a law authorizing
cities situated on the seacoast to issue
negotiable bonds would be a local law,
and a law providing for a stay of execution on judgments against physicians
would be a special law, although in
both cases the legislation would be for a
class. In order to sustain the classification it must bear some relation to the
general purpose of the law, and not be
merely arbitrary. It must be a classification of the stbject of the legislation,
and not merely an arbitrary selection of
the places within which or the persons on
whom it is to operate-a classification
designed to secure and not to evade
uniformity of legislation.
If, to use the example already given,
the purpose of an act, is to establish
quarantine regulations in seaports, the
legislature may confine such legislation
to that class of cities to which alone it is
applicable, but, if the subject of the legislation is the increase of municipal
indebtedness, it cannot be confined to
certain localities by a classification
which has no relation to that subject.
So if the purpose of an act is to regulate
.the practice of medicine, physicians may
be classified, but if it is to provide for
and regulate the stay of execution it
cannot be confined in its operation to
physicians by simply grouping them in a
class. See Anderson v. City of Trenton,
42 N. J. L. 486; Hammerv. State, 44 Id.
667 : Com. v. Patton, 88 Penn. St. 258.
The question as to the propriety
of the classification is often an extremely difficult one. In one case it
has been said that the legislature is
the sole judge as to what is a proper
classification: Ex parte Spinney, 10
Nev. 323. But while it is true, as
was pointed out in Anderson v. City of.
Trenton, supra, that it is not for the courts
to decide whether a classification is wise
or unwise, provided the subjects of the
classification are such as may be naturally grouped together in the matter of
the proposed legislation, the great

weight of authority is in favor of the
proposition that the courts must decide
whether the classification is a proper
one under the principles above stated:
Anderson v. City of Trenton, 42 N. J.
L. 486; Hammer v. State, 44 Id. 667;
State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340 ; Com. v.
Patton, 88 Penn. St. 258; Davis v.
Clark, 15 Weekly Notes 209; 'Earl
v. Bd. of Ed., 55 Cal. 489; E parte "
Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550; Mitchell v.
McCorkle, 69 Ind. 184.
One other principle is applied by the
courts in the interpretation of these constitutional provisions, viz., that in every
case the court will look at the substance
and not the form of the statute, and thats
even where the classification is of individuals naturally related in the matter
of the proposed legislation if it is so
done as to be really legislation for particular localities or individuals, and can-,
not, in the future, apply to others which
would naturally belong in the same
class, it is invalid : Com. v. Patton, 88
Penn. St. 25 ; Scowden's Appeal, 96
Id. 422; Davis v. Clark, 15 Weekly
Notes 209; Couteri v. Mayor, 4'c., 44
N. J. L. 58; Ziegler v. Gaddis, Id.
363; State v. Lawrence Bridge Co., 22
Kans. 438 ; Devine v. Corrs., 84 Ill.
590; People v. Cooper, 83 Id. 585 ;
State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102;
State v. Mitchell, 31 Id. 592.
It will be seen that it is difficult if not
impossible to formulate an exact definition of local and special legislation which
shall apply to all the cases arising under
the constitutional provisions above referred to. Perhaps the nearest approach
to such definition would be to say that a
local act is one which is operative within
only a portion of the territory occupied
by the persons or things to which the
legislation naturally and properly relates, and that a special act is one which
applies only to a portion of the individuals of the class to which the legislation naturally, and properly relates.
This leaves a very wide field for judicial
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decision, a result, however, which almost
inevitably follows every attempt to
guard against unwise legislation by
restrictions whfich must be interpreted
and enforced by the courts.
In addition to the questions above discussed numerous cases have arisen
under particular clauses of these constitutional enactments, but the limits of
this note forbid mo.re than the following
reference to'the cases :
Actfs conferring corporate powers:
Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568;
School District v. Ins. Co., 103 Id. 707;
Clegg v. School District, 8 Neb. 178;
Dundy v. Richardson Co., Id. 508;

tate. v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54;
State v. Mitchell, 31 Id. 592 ; State v.
Hoffman, 35 Id. 435 ; State v. Squires,
26 Iowa 346.
Regulating the internal affairs of
towns or counties: Van Riper-v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 1 i Freeholders of
aaic v. &tevenson, 46 Id. 173.

Regulating municipal bisiness: Williams v. Biddleman, 7 Nev. 68 ; Young
v. Hall, 9 Id. 212; McConihe v. State,
17 Fla. 338; State v. Padgett, 19 Id.
518; Conp's. v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247.
Regulating
affairs of townships:
Montgomery v. Com., 91 Penn. St. 125.
Regulating practice of courts of justice : Henry Sticknoth's Estate, 7 Nev.
223; State v; Kring, 74 Mo. 612.
Relating to the assessment and collection of taxes-: State v. Cal. J1. Co.,
15 Nev. 234; State v. Con. 4 kAI. Co.,
16 Id. 432 ; Manning v. Klippel, 9 Or.
367 ; Holst v. Roe, 39 Ohio St. 340.
Releasing persons from debts or obligations to state : Montague v. State, 54
Md. 481.
Providing for the management of
common schools: Earle v. Bd. of Ed.,
55 Cal. 489; Speight v. People, 87 Ill.
595.
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A qleeping car company does not incur towards a passenger the stringent liability
of an innkeeper, but impliedly undertakes to keep a reasonable watch over the
passenger and his property. The faithful performance of this undertaking is the
limit of its.duty, and it is, therefore; not enough for a passenger to show a loss-he
must also show some negligence on the part of the company or its employees.

APPEAL from Jefferson Court of Common Pleas.

Sterlinj B. Toney, for appellant.
Tmple Bod4W, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RICHARDS, J.-T. G. Gayl6rd sued the Pullman Palace Car
Company to recover 6300, the value of a diamond scarf-pin stolen
from him while a passenger on one of the defendant's cars. A
demurrer having been overruled to the petition, and the company
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declining to plead further, a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, proof as to the value of the pin having been waived.
The material facts admitted by the demurrer arMe that plaintiff,
being the holder of a first-class ticket from Chicago to Louisville
by way of the Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railroad, purchased from the defendant, for the price of $2, a ticket entitling
him to a berth on its car attached to the train'on said road; that
he entered said car at night, and was assigned a berth by the officer
in charge; he disrobed himself, placing the scarf, which was worn
by him and contained said pin, in the receptacle at or near the end
of the berth within the walls of the sub-apartment called the section-; that said receptacle, at or near the head. of plaintiff's
lbed, had been prepared by the company for such articles; that
thereafter, while he was asleep, said pin, without the fault of the
plaintiff, was stolen from said receptacle, and has not been returned, though demanded of the defendant; and that said pin was
such as persons in plaintiff's social and pecuniary condition in life
ordinarily wear as a proper article of dress. There was no allegation that the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the defendant,'
or that its agents in charge of the car had not exercised reasonable
care in watching over the sleeper.
It is conceded by the learned counsel for the appellee that as to
* this loss the defendant can neither l e regarded as a common carrier
nor an innkeeper; but he insists that the reasons which underlie
the principles of the common law making the carrier or innkeeper,
liable to the owner for the loss of goods, extend to this case, and
that, therefore, the same rules should be applied in determining
the defendant's responsibilities.
The common law made the carrier of goods, received for transportation, an insurer for their safe delivery, and he could only
excuse himself for the loss by showing that it had been occasioned
by the act of God or of the king's enemies. It imposed on innkeepers "a responsibility nearly commensurable with that-of con-'
mon carriers;" they were made primafacie liable for all articles
" confided expressly or impliedly to their custody and care," but
the grounds upon which they might defend were not so limited as
in the case of the carrier: Weisenger v. Taylor, 1 Bush 276.
But in dealing with carriers of passengers, these rigid rules have
never been extended beyond the baggage expressly intrusted to
their custody. The rights, duties and liabilities of the passenger
-

-
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and carrier by land were well settled before the introduction of
sleeping cars. The carrier became the insurer of all baggage
received' by him, and was bound to deliver it safely at its destination, unless prevented by the act of God or the public enemy.
But as to such articles as the passenger retained about his person
or in his possession, if they were lost or injured, the carrier-was not
responsible therefor, unless occasioned by his negligence; and this
rule was even extended to such paraphernalia as the passenger
could not reasonably be expected to part with during his journey.
SWlhether the -passenger remained awake or slept in his seat, the
carrier wa's under no obligation to guard him against theft from his
fellow travellers.
!, But as to carriers of passengers by water, where they bad paid
'for the privilege of occupying state-rooms, in which they were
invited to sleep, the duties and liabilities of the respective parties
do not seem to have been so definitely determined. In some courts
ithas been held that a steamboat company was liable to the occu<pant of a state-room, in the absence of negligence or fraud on his
part, for the value of articles properly worn about his person, if
stolen while he was asleep at night. 'But the opinion expressed by
..
, Chief Justice GRAY, in Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275, seems to
"ccod with the weight of authority. The court there say: 4'The
- defendants, as owners of steambokts carrying passengers and goods
for -hire, were not innkeepers. They would be subject to the
liability of common carriers for the baggage of passengers in their
custody, and might, perhaps, be so liable for the watch of a passenger locked up in his trunk with other baggage. But a watch,
worn by a passenger on his person by day and kept by him within
reach. for use 4t night, whether retained upon his person or placed
under his pillow, or in a pocket of his clothing hanging near him,
is not so intrusted to their custody and control as to -make them
liable for it as common carriers." The distinguished jurist cites a
number of authorities in support of' this position, among them,
&eamboat 6Wrgtal Palace v. Vanderpool, 16 B. M. 402. In
'that case, Vanderpool, having been robbed of a watch, diamond
pin and a sum of money, sued the owners of the boat for their

value. On the night of the larceny he communicated to a servant
".:';the_
boat the fact that the lock on the door of his state-rodin was
ut-of order and could not be fastened. The servant instructed
himn to place a chair and his baggage against the door, which he
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did. The articles in question were worn and carried on the person,
of the plaintiff, and on retiring they were placed on "achair and a'
shirt thrown over them. , On the following morning it was discovered that they had been stolen during the night. The court
says: " Steamboats are, in some respects, analogous to inns, and it
Wiould greatly promote the ease, comfort and safety of the travelling community if their owners were held responsible to the sam
extent that innkeepers are; but, so far as we know, they have,
never been held accountable upon the principles applicable to innkeepers, and we suppose that thousands of instances have occurred on
steamboats, of depredations like the one perpetrated on the plaintiff,
and yet we have heard of no case in which the principles of law
governing innkeepers have been extended to steamboat owners.
*

* *.

Steamboat owners are regarded as common carriers, and

are subject to the well-established principles governing their
responsibilities; and we are 'not aware of any principles by
which common carriers can be held responsible for the wearing
apparel of the passenger or his money which he carries upon his
person, and which is under his own immediate care and control.
When such things are made baggage, and delivered to the 6wners
or their agents, the rule is different, and their responsibility is
regulated by the established rules in reference to the baggage of
passengqrs."
It would be difficult to give any valid reason why a sleeping-car
company should be held to any more rigid liability in such cases
than a steamboat company. It could no more be said that a sleeping car was an "inn on wheels" than that a steamboat was an inn
on water. They both provide sleeping apartments for passengers,
who pay for the privilege and are expected to occupy them. Sleep
is as essential to the health and comfort of the traveller in the one
case as in the other. The servants of the steamboat company certainly have the implied custody of the passenger's wearing apparel
to as great an extent as the servants of the sleeping-car company.
The resemblance of a steamboat to an inn is even greater than that
of the sleeping-car, since it is customary for the former to provide
meals for its passengers. If, then, the rigid liability of innkeepers is not to be extended to the owners of steamboats, common
justice demands that it be not applied to the owners of sleeping
cars. And we find this rule has been followed so far as the responsibilities of the latter have been the subject of judicial inquiry.

-
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While these adjudications are not placed upon the.same ground,
their conclusions are substantially the same. We cannot concur
in some of the reasons assigned in the various opinions, but we
think their decisions are, in the main correct.
In Plum v. Pullman Sleepinq (ar Co., 3 Cent. Law Journal
592, the United States Circuit Court in Tennessee, Judge BRoWN
presiding, held that the company was not liable, either as an innkeeper ot a common carrier, for money stolen from a passenger's
pocket; but at the same time the court discussed what was considered the true relations between the company and its passengers,
and held that the former was bound to keep a watch during the
night to exclude unauthorized persons from the car, and "must
take reasonable care of their guests and property, especially while
said guests are asleep."
In Palmeter v. Wagner, discussed in 11 Albany Law Journal
149, the Marine Court of New York held that sleeping-car companies were not insurers, innkeepers'nor transporters, nevertheless
they must, by a reasonable watch, protect a passenger and the'
property about his person during sleep.
. In Welsh v. .Pullman Palace Car Go., 16 Abb. Pr. (N, S.)
252, it wai held that the defendant was not responsible for an overcoat, which the plaintiff, upon going to sleep, had hung in the
berth above him. The 'ourt says: "The traveller voluntarily,
and not of necessity, availed himself of what was placed before him
fbr his comfort, and he cannot cast the burden of care and 'diligpnce upon the defendant, neither is it right of Just that the law
should do so." We think that the learned court has gone too far
in this ease in exonerating such companies. They assume that
"the mdst discreet and vigilant officers of a car cannot prevent
depredations," and conclude that no duty attaches to the company
in respect to the 'articles taken into the car by the passenger.
They place the passenger upon the sleeping-car upon precisely the
same footing as a passenger upon any-other coach attached to the
train. In this we think the court has gone 'too far; nor did
the facts of that case require this extreme view.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Pullman Palace Car 0o. v.
Smith, 73 Ill. 860, has considered this question. There Smith
sted the company to recover $1180. The court instructed the
'jury that if they believed from the evidence that the plaintiff had
been robbed while travelling on the defendant's car they should
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find for him the amount lost, provided it did not exceed what
would be a reasonable sum for him to carry on the journey he was
taking. The verdict was for $2T7 in plaintiff's favor. The court
say: "The instruction which the court gave to the jury made the
company responsible as insurer for the safety of the money, imposing upon it the severe liability of an innkeeper or commoh
carrier. * * * It would be unreasonable to make the company

responsible for the loss of money which was never intrusted to its
custody at all, of which it had no information, and which the
owner had concealed upon his person. The exposure to the
hazard of liability for losses through collusion, for pretended claims
of loss where there would be no means of dispro6f, would make
the responsibility claimed a fearful one. Appellee assumed the
exclusive custody of his money, adopted his own measures for its
safe-keeping by himself, and we think his must be the responsibility of its loss." Here again the court, finding that the defendant did not come within the ancient definition of a common carrier
of goods, nor the Blackstonian' definition of an innkeeper, reversed
the judgment against the company, and in doing so used language
that would indicate the company was not to be held liable for such
losses under any circumstances. As to whether the defendant,
although not in fact an innkeeper or common carrier of goods,
undertook the performance of any duty in assuming its peculiar relaiions with the plaintiff, which would require it to watch over the
plaintiff and his goods, was not discussed.
But it seems to us that the Supreme Court of Indiana, in the
case of Woodruff, ,S. & P. . Co. v. Diel, 84 Ind. 474, has
more accurately defined the duties and liabilities of the parties
under such circumstances. There the plaintiff had lost his pocketmoney, watch, chain and locket. The petition alleged that "the
appellant and its servants so carelessly and negligently conducted
and behaved themselves in not keeping proper care and watch, and
in not furnishing sleeping places which could be securely fastened,
and in being otherwise careless and negligent, that by and through
the said carelessness, negligence and default of the appellant and
its servants in that behalf," the said property was lost. The special
finding of the lower court was, "that the plaintiff's loss was' occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep a
sufficient watch during the night, and to take reasonable care to
prevent thefts, and that the plaintiff was without fault. Upon this
V o.
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ground a judgment in the plaintiffs favor for the value of the
articles was affirmed.
While, therefore, the stringent liability of an innkeeper, which
the distinguished Chief Justice COLERIDGE has said does not
"stand on mere reason, but on custom, growing out of a state of
society no longer existing," is not to be applied to the owners
of sleeping cars, it does not follow that they assume no duties or
liabilities. These cars are in themselves an invitation to the tra.velling public to enter and protect themselves against the weariness
of a long journey by disrobing and sleeping.
The passenger in buying and the company in selling the ticket
contemplate that this privilege will be improved. The company
accepting compensation under these circumstances impliedly undertakes to keep a reasonable watch over the passenger and his property. The faithful performance of this undertaking is the limit
of its duty in this respect. Its breach must be the foundation of
every action'seeking to charge the company with the loss of articles
the passenger has taken with him upon the car.
In the case at bar the defendant was held liable without regard
to the faithfulness of its servants. If they exercised proper care
by keeping a reasonable watch over the plaintiff's property, there
was no breach of any undertaking on the part of the company, and
hence no liability.
For this reason the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to sustain the demurrer.

Circuit Court, Eastern -Districtof Pennsylvania.
HATCtt v. ADAMS.
A purchaser of patented articles from a territorial assignee of the patent, does not
acquire the right to sell the articles in the course of trade outside the territory
granted to his vendor.

FINAL HEARING.

This was a bill filed by 0. L. Hatch, the owner of a patent for
improvement in spring bed bottoms, and Elmer H. Grey & Co., to
whom he had given an exclusive license in certain territory, against
W. J. Adams, a dealer in bed bottoms, who was selling such patented improvement within said territory. The case was argued
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* upon the following facts, a statement of which was, by agreement,
filed in lieu of an answer and proofs.
William B. Hatch was the inventor of an improvement in spring
bed bottoms, the right to which was secured by re-issued -letters
patent No. 9576. By various assignments the title to said letters
patent became vested in C. L. Stillman. On August 1st 1881,
Stillman assigned to Mrs. Nellie C. Hedley, his right, title and
interest in said invention for, to and in the state bf New York.
On June 28th 1882, Stillman assigned to the complainant, 0. L.
Hatch, all his right, title and interest in said letters patent. On
September 5th 1883, Nellie C. Hedley granted to Francis A.
Hall the exclusive license and right to make, use' and sell said
improvement within the following designated places, viz.: to manufacture in the city of New York or Brooklyn, and sell in the state
of New York and elsewhere. On April 1st 1884, 0. L. Hatch
granted to Elmer H. Grey & Co., complainants, the exclusive right
to make, sell and vend said improvement within the territory comprising the states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Tennessee and
the District of Columbia.
The respondent, W. J. Adams, was a dealer in bed bottoms in
Philadelphia, and in the course of his business purchased from
Francis A. Hall, in New York, bed bottoms containing the patented improvement. These bed bottoms Adams brought to Philadelphia, and sold in the course of his business to dealers in the
latter city. To restrain such sales the present bill was filed.
Prank P. Prichard,for complainant.
Warren G. Grifflth, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MCKENNAN, CIR. J.-This case involves a single question, to
wit : Has a purchaser of patented articles from a grantee of an
exclusive right to manufacture and sell under the patent' in a
specified part of the United States, the right to sell the articles,
in the course of trade, outside the designated limits covered'by the
grant to his vendor?
In the absence of authority to the contrary, we would feel constrained to answer this question in the negative. While the Patent
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Act secures to an inventor the exclusive right to manufacture, use
and sell his invention, it authorizes him to divide up his monopoly
into territorial parcels, and so to grant to others an exclusive right
under the patent to the whole or a specified part of the United
States. Undoubtedly the grantee would take and hold the right
conveyed subject to the limitations of the grant, and hence he
could not lawfully exercise it outside of the territorial limits to
which he was restricted. It would be illogical then to assume that
he could confer upon a vendee a privilege with which he was not
invested, and which he could not exercise himself.
It has been held, however, that an unrestricted sale of a pat'ented article carries with it the right to its unlimited use. But the
reason upon which this rule rests involves a plain distinction
between the right to use and the right to manufacture and sell an invention, and is inapplicable to their definition. In Adams v. Burke,
17 Wall. 455, Mr. Justice MILLER thus explains the import and
scope of the decisions on the subject: " W e have repeatedly held
that where a person had purchased a patented machine of the patentee or his assignee, this purchase carried with it the right to the
use of that machine so long as it was capable of use, and that
the expiration and renewal of the patent, whether in favor of the
original patentee or his assignee, did not affect this right. The
true ground on which these decisions rest is, that the sale by a
person who has the full right to make, sell and use such a machine,
carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full
extent to which it can be used in point of time." "The right to
manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to use, are each substantive rights, and may be granted or conferred separately by the
patentee."
" But in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or
the person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose
sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use,
and he parts with the right to restrict that use. The article, in
the language of the court, passes without the limit of the monopoly.
That is to say, the patentee, or his assignee, having in the act of
sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for
the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument,
it is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on
account of the monopoly of the patentee."
The only question in this case, as shown by the pleading,
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involved the right of the purchaser of coffin lids, bought within
a radius of ten miles from Boston, the right to make, sell and use
which was restricted to that circle, to use them outside of it. The
court sustained the right, saying: "That so far as the use of it
was concerned, the patentee had received his consideration, and it
was no longer within the monopoly of the patent. It would be to
engraft a limitation upon the right of use not contemplated by the
statute, nor within the reason of the contract, to say that it could
only be used within the ten miles circle. Whatever, therefore,
may be the rule where patentees sub-divide their patents, as to the
exclusive right to make or sell, within a limited territory, we hold
that, in the class of machines or implements which we have
described, when they are once lawfully made and sold, there is no
restriction upon their use to be implied for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees." Even with this careful limi-"
tation of the judgment of the court, Justices BRADLEY, SWAYNE
and STRONG dissented, insisting that the locality of the usd, as
well as of the manufacture and sale, of the patented article was
restricted by the grant, and that it ought accordingly to be enforced.
It may be said then, that, while this case, with others which pre.
cede it, determine, for peculiar reasons, that the lawful sale of a
patented article carries with it the right to the unrestricted use of
such article as to time or locality, it is the fair import of them that
no other "substantive right" conferred by the patent is thereby
affected.
Our attention has been called to two cases decided by Circuit
Courts, which demand a brief notice.
The first of these was Adams v. Burke, 4 Fisher 892. It was
decided by Judge SHEPLEY, and his statement of the law is certainly broad enough to cover the right to sell, as well as the right
to use, a patented article outside of a restricted locality. But
only the latter right was involved in the case. What was said
then by the learned judge touching the right to sell was clearly
obiter, and when the case reached the Supreme Court (Adams v.
Burke, 17 Wall. supra), that court expressly treated the right to
manufacture and sell, and the right to use a patented article, as
distinct substantive rights, and decided the law only as it related
to the exercise of the latter right.
The remaining case, McKay v. Wooster, 2 Sawyer 373, was
ruled upon the opinion of Judge SHEPLEY in Adams v. Burke,

